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BOOK REVIEW
RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY IN SCOTS LAW:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Dundee
University Press, 2009)
Reviewed by Olivier Moréteau*
This book features a collection of papers presented at a
Conference organized on May 5 and 6, 2006, at the University of
Strathclyde in Glasgow. The Conference aimed at giving an
overview of issues and options available in Scots law regarding the
protection of personality rights. The perspective was comparative,
covering various civil law and common jurisdictions and other
mixed jurisdictions. The concept of personality right is of civil law
fabric. Rooted in Roman law, the term „rights of the personality‟
was coined by 20th century civilian doctrine to describe the
protection of non-patrimonial aspects of the human person, such as
life, bodily integrity, personal security, physical liberty, reputation,
dignity, privacy, image, moral right to copyright, family
relationships, rights of deceased‟s relatives. The essays gathered in
the book tend to prove however that the Scottish approach is more
remedy-based than right-based, the focus being on the tort action
and its conditions. Personality rights are all too often entangled
with patrimonial rights, and the identification of a personality
rights will at most help identify a primary right that deserves
protection even where the loss is entirely non-pecuniary.
There is much focus on the taxonomy of personality rights,
checking what is included here and excluded there. It is common
knowledge, at least in civil law jurisdictions, that personality rights
are inalienable, imprescriptible, and cannot be abandoned. The
book offers little discussion however of what personality rights are
in essence. Such rights can indeed be monetized, and the
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borderline between the extra-patrimonial and the patrimonial rights
is not always an easy one to draw, as some cases discussed in the
book may show. The right an actress has on her image under
French law may serve as an example. A case decided in Paris in
1975 featured French superstar Catherine Deneuve.1 She had
consented to the publication of photos taken at a time when she
was acting as a professional model, occasionally posing in the
nude. The magazine who had published such photos sold them to
another magazine that republished those years later, at a time when
Catherine Deneuve had become an iconic and highly respected
actress. Though the magazine owned the pictures, Catherine
Deneuve was allowed to object to the publication and argue that
her personality right to her image had been invaded. The court held
that the magazine was supposed to request her consent prior to
publication. Any attorney or scholar familiar with French cases
knows that the more a person protects her privacy or image rights,
the more likely she is of being awarded higher damages in case of
infringement of such rights. On the contrary, famous people who
usually tolerate the publication of gossip and photos taken within
the realm of their private life, though not losing the right to
protection—after all it is inalienable and may not be abandoned—
are more likely than not to get minimal or nominal damages. Given
the fact that tabloids will anyway publish gossip to maximize their
sales, celebrities, by choosing not to tolerate any infringement, can
monetize their private life and image by selling ex ante the right to
publish under pre-determined conditions, or collecting ex post in
the form of damages that French courts try to keep sufficiently
high to serve as deterrent. That point is strongly criticized by both
editors of the book: Niall Whitty in his essay in the book2 and
Reinhard Zimmermann in his major book on the law of
obligations.3 The reading of the book shows that Scotland looks at
personality rights with tort law lenses rather than with overpermissive subjective rights lenses, thereby limiting the risk of
commodification of extra-patrimonial rights, all too real in French

1.
Dame Dorléac dite Catherine Deneuve v. Société anonyme PresseOffice, Dalloz 1976, 291, note R. Lindon (Court of Appeal of Paris, judgment of
May 14, 1975).
2.
At 197.
3.
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 1089 (1990).
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jurisprudence, where the right to respect of one‟s image was once
based on property rights.4
One may compare this with the moral right of the author or
artist under copyright law. In most civil law jurisdictions and under
the Bern Convention, the artist or author of copyrighted work may
sell the copyright, which is intellectual property and therefore
patrimonial, yet keeping at all times a moral right allowing her to
object to a use of the work that in the opinion of the author would
distort the artistic value of the work. This moral right being
attached to the personality of the creator is inalienable and cannot
be abandoned, and is therefore a personality right. The study by
David Vaver (Chapter 8)5 shows that the moral right is much
weaker at English law where it may be waived. In jurisdictions
where it is stronger, it may be monetized much like the right to
one‟s image in the example above.
Born and developed in the matrix of private law, the concept of
personality right has grown a constitutional dimension, which is
not surprising given the fact that it enshrines personal freedom and
human dignity. This constitutional dimension is a central feature of
several of the papers gathered in the book. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) indeed strengthens the
fundamental rights dimension with Article 8(1) that provides:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence,” the same Convention protecting
liberty of expression and freedom of the press in its Article 10. It
was not until the year 2000 that the ECHR was to acquire the force
of law in the United Kingdom and therefore in Scotland, by the
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998. The impact of the ECHR in
Scotland is carefully researched by Elspeth Reid (Chapter 4),6 who
investigates to what extent Convention rights, in so far as they
address rights of personality, already find protection in Scots law.
She uses comparative law to identify possible gaps and

4.
Karine Anterion & Olivier Moréteau, The Protection of Personality
Rights Against Invasions by Mass Media in France, in THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA 124, (Helmut
Koziol & Alexander Warzilek eds. 2005).
5.
Does Intellectual Property Have Personality?, 403.
6.
Protection of Personality Rights in the Modern Scots Law of Delict,
247.
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developments that may be needed. She clearly indicates that one
has to look beyond England, and points out to South Africa,
another mixed jurisdiction, and countries of continental Europe.
South Africa is ubiquitous in the volume, which is not
surprising, since much like Scotland, it is a mixed jurisdiction
without a civil code. Jonathan Burchell offers a detailed
presentation in Chapter 6, with a focus on human dignity.7 He
shows the use of the actio iniuriarum, “the general Roman remedy
for impairments of personality rights to physical integrity,
reputation, and dignity”8 as a basis of the protection of personality
rights in South Africa before and after the Constitution of 1996.
Post-apartheid developments include the right to housing, the right
to social security and appropriate social assistance for those unable
to support themselves,9 the right to family life, due process rights,
showing flexible adjustments. The Roman law concept of iniuria
indeed easily adjusts to the new constitutional and legislative
requirements to favor the enforcement of human rights. Professor
Burchell‟s contribution is a plea in favor of the delictual actio
iniuriarum: “The objective criterion will allow a court to balance
the interests involved, engage in a proportionality inquiry weighing
issues such as need, available resources, degree of harm, urgency
of relief, including availability of alternative remedies, and
recognize those defences that reflect reasonable behavior.”10 He
shows “the pivotal nature of dignity” as a right and not just a value.
He reminds the Scots that T.B. Smith was in favor of a rejuvenated
actio iniuriarum focused on the concept of “affront”
(contumelia).11 Much in this contribution is of great interest for
Scotland as well as other mixed jurisdictions such as Louisiana.
The laws of Continental Europe are explored in Chapter 5,
written by Gert Brüggemeier, covering France, Germany, and
Italy.12 Professor Brüggemeier rightly points to the hybrid nature
of personality rights, which constitute in his opinion a sort of

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Personality Rights in South Africa: Re-Affirming Dignity, 349.
At 351.
At 367.
At 377.
At 381. See T.B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
SCOTLAND 653-654 (1962).
12.
Protection of Personality Interests in Continental Europe: The
Examples of France, Germany and Italy, and a European Perspective, at 313.
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“private human rights.”13 Born in the realm of private law from the
Roman law of injuries (actio iniuriarum), it was given
constitutional protection after World War II, in national
constitutions and also in the ECHR. He concludes his survey of the
law in the three countries by a section on the ECHR and an
analysis of the Caroline von Hannover v. Germany case, decided
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004. The case shows
how difficult it is to balance the protection of private life (Art. 8
ECHR) with freedom of expression and of the press, also protected
by the Convention (Art. 10 ECHR), an issue that has been
carefully studied in the context of European tort law.14 It also
indicates a possible diversity of approach regarding the protection
of the private life of celebrities. French courts insist that everyone,
including celebrities, is entitled to the protection of one‟s private
life on the basis of the overreaching provision of Civil Code, Art.
9. This places the burden on journalists to prove that they have
obtained prior consent before publishing stories or pictures
featuring celebrities in their private life, even when the story takes
place outside private walls, in the eye of the public. Neglecting
these details, the author rightly insists on the somehow
constitutional nature of Art. 9.15
Germany has a different approach in the sense that courts,
following a law enacted in 1907, accept that pictures of public
figures can be taken and published without their express consent
except where taken within their residential areas.16 In Caroline von
Hannover v. Germany, the European Court held that even pictures
taken outside the private residence had to be authorized, Art. 8
extending the protection to everyone, including celebrities. It is
only when public figures perform in an “official function,” that the
right to privacy is not to be applied, a position long adopted by
French law, which is in compliance with Art. 8 ECHR. Regarding
the right to informational privacy, Scots law had a restrictive

13.
At 317.
14.
The Protection of Personality Rights against Invasions by Mass
Media, supra note 4.
15.
At 322. After all, the French Civil Code has been represented to be
the “civil constitution” of the country: see Olivier Moréteau, The Future of Civil
Codes in France and Louisiana, 2 JCLS 39, 44 (2009).
16.
Details at 342.
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approach in the sense that protection was only afforded when the
information was wrong or malicious (malicious falsehood). The
scope is considerably enlarged with the implementation of ECHR,
Art. 8.
Whether they are familiar with Scots law or not, readers will
learn a lot reading the first chapters of the book. Issues and options
are clearly exposed by the editors in Chapter 1, which gives an
overview of the subject insisting on the historical and political
background that makes Scotland such a unique place before and
after devolution.17 The editors then focus on what they view as the
key issues, and not surprisingly these include the integration of the
ECHR right to privacy. Other questions pop up such as how to
protect rights of personality, whether a right to publicity should be
introduced, and whether personality rights should be codified, a
question that in their opinion deserves a negative answer.
Following chapters address these questions. In what appears to
be the longest contribution in the book (Chapter 2 counts over 110
pages), John Blackie gives a rich and detailed overview of the
history of personality rights in Scots law, from the 16th century to
the mid-19th century,18 looking backwards (doctrinal history),
sideways (comparative law), and forward (law reform proposals)
to make informed decision as to where to go.19 Readers having a
lesser interest in legal history will value the Editors‟ summary of
John Blackie‟s findings.20 His well-documented exploration shows
how much Scots law was based on the ius commune until it
received English influence during the 19th century. Real injury
(iniuria realis) and verbal injury (iniuria verbalis) evolved and
developed as sub-categories of iniuria, generating a complex and
confusing taxonomy. The full page figures at p. 38 (the delict of
iniuria in Scotland in 1700) and 103 (the delict of injury in 1850)
give a fascinating overview of shifting categories and the text
reveals the fertility and flexibility of the delict of injury to cover
new situations, such as invasions of privacy once people‟s sphere
of privacy started to expand.

17.
18.
31.
19.
20.

Rights of Personality in Scots Law: Issues and Options, at 1.
Unity in Diversity:The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law, at
See the Editors comment, at 24.
At 10-12.
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Niall Whitty, co-editor of the book, gives a full overview of
rights of privacy in Scots law (Chapter 3).21 His hundred-page long
chapter insists on categories that vary from one system to another.
After defining the fundamental concepts, and particularly those of
real and verbal injury derived from Roman law, but also those of
dignity, autonomy, and privacy, he ventures into categorizing,
using Johan Neethling‟s typology as a starting point.22 Such
personality rights are primary rights and their infringement is a
delict, imposing a secondary obligation on the wrongdoer to repair
or remedy. The primary right might be imprescriptible, the
secondary one is not and may be extinguished by prescription. He
then describes the thirteen personality rights identified by
Neethling: right to life, the rights to bodily integrity and to
personal security, the right to physical liberty, the right to honor
and reputation, the right to dignity in the narrow sense (selfesteem; honor; and freedom from insult), the right to privacy
(seclusion from intrusion), the right to informational privacy (nondisclosure of private information), the right to identity or image,
the right to publicity (appropriation of image and reification of
right to privacy and image), the moral right to copyright, the right
to autonomy (still debated in Scotland), personality rights in family
relationships, personality rights after death. Professor Whitty‟s
treatment of the elements of liability for infringing rights of
personality shows the paramount importance of tort law concepts
in this area and as everywhere in his essay the approach is
comparative, showing familiarity with European projects such as
the Principles of European Tort Law. Transmissibility of the action
and remedies are also discussed in this very rich essay.
There is much more in the book, including the already
mentioned Continental European and South African perspectives
to which one must add a very informative discussion of English
law perspectives, by Hazel Carty, showing how English law
remains “mistrustful of generalised rights” (Chapter 7).23 The final

21.
Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law, at 147.
22.
At. 164. Reference is made to JOHAN NEETHLING, J.M. POTGIETER &
P.J. VISSER, NEETHLING‟S LAW OF PERSONALITY (2d ed. 2005). See also J.
Neethling, Personality Rights, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(J. Smits ed. 2006), at Chapter 48.
23.
Personality Rights and English Law 383, at 384.
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chapters cover defamation,24 autonomy in medical law,25 and a
presentation of the very impressive personality database covering a
number of significant legal systems, that has fed a comparative
survey, discussed by Charlotte Waelde and Niall Whitty.26 Hector
McQueen‟s Hitchhiker‟s guide to personality rights in Scots law
concludes the volume, road mapping the complex personality
rights galaxy in Scots law.27 May be for the reason that it primarily
addresses privacy, it has not been placed at the beginning of the
volume, where the reader would be happy to find a road map. It
inevitably repeats some information available elsewhere in the
book but offers a most valuable guide, starting with the impact of
the Human Rights Act 1998 and ending with a survey of other
relevant statutes, also promenading through English cases on
breach of confidence and the actio iniuriarum of Scots law.
Altogether, this is a remarkable and most informative
comparative law book that every scholar interested in personality
rights in Scotland, Europe, or in any other jurisdiction must read or
consult. More generally, the book shows the great vitality of the
civil law tradition of Scotland and the many ways it interacts both
with English law and European law and keeps developing as a very
dynamic mixed jurisdiction, connected to so many others. In the
reviewer‟s opinion, there is no better place than mixed jurisdictions
to test legal theories and doctrines, see how they interact and
identify what is working best. Scotland has developed a pragmatic
view of what personality rights are, half way between the
generalization of the French and the casuistic approach of the
English, proving in this field as in others that Scots law is a
modern continuation of Roman law. A French scholar trained in
France and having migrated to another mixed jurisdiction, the
reviewer cannot help thinking that the late Hélène David28 and

24.
Kenneth Norrie, The Scots Law of Defamation: Is there a Need for
Reform?, at 433.
25.
Graeme Laurie, Personality, Privacy and Autonomy in Medical Law,
at 453.
26.
This is a major project conducted at the University of Edinburgh: A
Right of Personality Database, at 485.
27.
A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with
Regards to Privacy, at 549.
28.
HELENE DAVID, INTRODUCTION A L‟ETUDE DU DROIT ECOSSAIS (Paris,
1972).
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T.B. Smith29 would have liked and valued this book, much as they
would also have enjoyed Mixed Jurisdictions Compared, Private
Law in Louisiana and Scotland, edited by Vernon Palmer and
Elspeth Reid,30 published that very same year, also containing an
essay on personality rights.31
Together with the Dundee University Press, the editors have
done a great job making the book easy to read and navigate, with a
sequential numbering of chapters and sections, detailed tables of
content at the beginning of every chapter, and useful indexes and
tables. This review will end where the book starts: the short
foreword by Lord Hope is a must read. It offers insightful thoughts
on the impact of academic work on the judiciary and the vital
importance of comparative law on the development of Scots law,
of which the book is a brilliant demonstration.

29.
See A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, T. B. SMITH AND THE
PROGRESS OF SCOTS LAW, (Elspeth Reid & David Miller eds. 2005).
30.
Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
31.
Elspeth Christie Reid, Personality Rights: A Study in Difference, at
387.

